

A1. Pilot Results on Value Moralization: MTurk and Lucid

As discussed in the main text, we pilot tested our expectations for value moralization across two samples, Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (MTurk) and Lucid, with similar designs. In each study, respondents were asked a series of questions about their partisan identity, ideology and political views, and then proceeded to the values module. In the values module, respondents were asked about a random subset of value statements. We find substantively the same results in the two samples, but the Lucid sample has much lower data quality.¹

Starting with MTurk, we recruited 802 respondents on November 23, 2021. Respondents were required to be located in the US, have completed at least 100 HITs, and have an approval rate of at least 95%. We also limited eligibility to the CloudResearch approved respondents to avoid problems with fraudulent respondents (Kennedy et al. 2020). Sample descriptive statistics are shown in Table A1. 802 respondents completed the survey, but we only keep respondents who passed the attention check question in the beginning of the survey (N=791).

Table A1: Descriptive Statistics of the MTurk Sample

	Min	Max	Mean	SD	N
PID	1	7	3.37	2.15	791
Male	0	1	0.51	0.50	791
White	0	1	0.79	0.40	791
Age	2	9	4.20	1.29	791
Education	1	7	4.41	1.28	791

Respondents were asked to evaluate six randomly selected value statements drawn from 87 statements that measure 21 values from three value systems.² Randomization of the value statements was stratified such that each respondent evaluated three items randomly selected from the Schwartz typology, one from MFT, and two political value items.³ After being presented with a value statement, as in the main study, respondents were asked to rate their agreement with it on a five-point agree-disagree scale. Then, respondents were asked to rate their moralization of their position on that value before moving to the next statement.

We stack the data such that each respondent provides up to six observations, with a total of 4,746 respondent-items. We analyze respondent-items for which the respondent endorses the relevant values ($n = 2,828$). We compare the three typologies to each other, averaging across values and items, by estimating the level of moralization as a function of dummy variables for


¹ As explained below, in spite of our considerable effort to screen out inattentive respondents, we found much smaller between-value differences on Lucid, consistent with data quality problems on this platform (Ternovski et al. 2022).

² Unlike in the main study, we had 87 statements (rather than 102), because at the time of the MTurk study, we did not include the relevance battery in the moral foundations questionnaire. We only used items from the judgment section.

³ This design provided approximate balance in the number of items evaluated per value.

each typology along with respondent random effects. Consistent with findings in the main text, moral foundations receive the highest average moralization (3.95), which is significantly higher than the average moralization of Schwartz values (3.42; $p < 0.001$) and marginally higher than for political values (3.82; $p = 0.062$). See Figure A1.

Figure A1. Moralization at the Typology Level, MTurk Sample



Note: Mean moralization estimates from an OLS model that regresses moral conviction on typology dummy variables and respondent random effects. These are coefficient estimates for the three typologies calculated in the model without an intercept. Full model results are available in column 1 of Table D1 in the Supplemental Materials on the Dataverse.

Turning to the Lucid sample, respondents were randomly assigned to six of a total of 22 values, then randomly assigned one item from within that value. Unlike the main study, there are 22 (instead of 21) values because in the moral foundations typology, we included items measuring a more specific version of fairness that focuses on proportionality (Skurka et al. 2020). We therefore had a total of 106 items.

Lucid Theorem provides a representative sample of U.S. adults balanced on age, gender, ethnicity, and region. Respondents were recruited between February 22 and March 3, 2022. Early in the survey and prior to the values module, we included two attention checks. Respondents who failed either attention were not allowed to continue the survey. Of 2,481 respondents who started the survey, only 1,134 (46%) passed both. We also included a short open-ended question asking respondents to name the US president. Respondents who did not give a coherent response are not included in analyses below, which excludes an additional 29 respondents (3%), for a final sample of 1,105 respondents. As we did not force responses to any of our questions, we have a total of 6,535 respondent-items. Sample descriptive statistics are shown in Table A2.


Table A2: Descriptive Statistics of the Lucid Sample

	Min	Max	Mean	SD	N
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PID	1	7	3.70	2.23	1105
Male	0	1	0.45	0.50	1040
White	0	1	0.73	0.44	1042
Age	2	9	4.69	1.72	1042
Education	1	7	3.62	1.46	1041

Figure A2 shows the results, i.e., estimates of moralization at the typology level among value supporters ($n = 3,844$).⁴ The results are similar to those in the main text, though less differentiated. The moral foundations again receive the highest moralization rating (3.95), which is significantly higher than both Schwartz (3.73; $p < .001$) and political values (3.72; $p < .001$). The latter two are not significantly different from each other, however ($p = .936$).

Figure A2. Moralization at the Typology Level, Lucid Sample




Note: Mean moralization estimates from an OLS model that regresses moral conviction on typology dummy variables and respondent random effects. These are coefficient estimates for the three typologies calculated in the model without an intercept. Full model results are available in column 2 of Table D1 in the Supplemental Materials on the Dataverse.

In line with the analyses presented in the main text, we also analyzed the results at the value level to examine variation within each typology. For each sample, the levels of moralization for each value are shown in Figure A3. We see results similar to those in the main text. But again, there is less variance in Lucid data. While variance in the estimates among the MTurk sample ranges from 2.59 (hedonism) to 4.56 (Care), in the Lucid sample, it ranges from 3.37 (stimulation) to 4.19 (Care). Thus, although the results are similar in direction, they differ substantially in magnitude. As mentioned earlier, we suspect this is due to much lower data

⁴ For consistency in the presentation of results, we exclude the moral foundations measure of Proportionality, which was not measured in the MTurk sample.

quality in the Lucid sample. Nonetheless, the correlation between the two sets of estimates is quite high ($r = .86$).

Figure A3. Moralization at the Value Level



Note: Mean moralization estimates from an OLS model that regresses moral conviction on value dummy variables and respondent random effects. These are coefficient estimates for the 21 fixed effects calculated in the model without an intercept. The value system of each of the values on

the vertical axis is indicated with “S” for Schwartz values, “P” for political values, and “MF” for moral foundations. Full model results are available in columns 1-2 of Table D2 in the Supplemental Materials on the Dataverse.

A2. Full List of Value Items

Below we list the 102 items used in the main study.

System	Value-Item	Statement
Schwartz PVQ	Self-direction 1	It is important to me to think up new ideas, be creative, and do things in my own original way.
Schwartz PVQ	Self-direction 2	It is important to me to make my own decisions and to be free to plan and choose activities for myself.
Schwartz PVQ	Self-direction 3	It is important to me to be interested, curious, and to try to understand all sorts of things.
Schwartz PVQ	Self-direction 4	It is important to me to be independent and to rely on myself.
Schwartz PVQ	Hedonism 1	It is important to me to seek every chance to have fun and to do things that give me pleasure.
Schwartz PVQ	Hedonism 2	It is important to me to enjoy life's pleasures and to 'spoil' myself.
Schwartz PVQ	Hedonism 3	It is important to me to really enjoy life and to have a good time.
Schwartz PVQ	Benevolence 1	It is important to me to help the people around me and to care for other people.
Schwartz PVQ	Benevolence 2	It is important to me to be loyal to my friends and to devote myself to people close to me.
Schwartz PVQ	Benevolence 3	It is important to me to respond to the needs of others and support those I know.
Schwartz PVQ	Benevolence 4	It is important to me to forgive people who have wronged me, to try to see good in them, and to try not to hold a grudge.
Schwartz PVQ	Power 1	It is important to me to have a lot of money and expensive things.
Schwartz PVQ	Power 2	It is important to me to be in charge and to tell others what to do.
Schwartz PVQ	Power 3	It is important to me to always be the one who makes decisions and to be the leader.
Schwartz PVQ	Universalism 1	It is important to me that every person in the world is treated equally and receives justice.
Schwartz PVQ	Universalism 2	It is important to me to listen to people who are different from me and understand them, even when I disagree with them.
Schwartz PVQ	Universalism 3	It is important to me to care for nature and to look after the environment.
Schwartz PVQ	Universalism 4	It is important to me to promote peace and harmony among all groups in the world.

Schwartz PVQ	Universalism 5	It is important to me to protect the weak in society and treat everyone justly, including people I don't know.
Schwartz PVQ	Universalism 6	It is important to me to adapt to nature and fit in to it, rather than try to change nature.
Schwartz PVQ	Achievement 1	It is important to me to show my abilities and be admired for them.
Schwartz PVQ	Achievement 2	It is important to me to be very successful and to impress other people.
Schwartz PVQ	Achievement 3	It is important to me to be ambitious and to show how capable I am.
Schwartz PVQ	Achievement 4	It is important to me to get ahead in life and to do better than others.
Schwartz PVQ	Security 1	It is important to me to live in secure surroundings and to avoid anything that might endanger my safety.
Schwartz PVQ	Security 2	It is important to me that my country is safe from threats within and without and that social order is protected.
Schwartz PVQ	Security 3	It is important to me to be organized and clean.
Schwartz PVQ	Security 4	It is important to me to avoid getting sick and to stay healthy.
Schwartz PVQ	Security 5	It is important to me to have a stable government and that social order is protected.
Schwartz PVQ	Stimulation 1	It is important to me to do lots of different things in life and to look for new things to try.
Schwartz PVQ	Stimulation 2	It is important to me to look for adventures and to take risks.
Schwartz PVQ	Stimulation 3	It is important to me to have an exciting life and to seek out surprises.
Schwartz PVQ	Conformity 1	It is important to me that people follow the rules and do what they're told, even when no one is watching.
Schwartz PVQ	Conformity 2	It is important to me to always behave properly and avoid doing anything people would say is wrong.
Schwartz PVQ	Conformity 3	It is important to me to be obedient and to show respect for my parents and to older people.
Schwartz PVQ	Conformity 4	It is important to me to always be polite to other people and to never disturb or irritate others.
Schwartz PVQ	Tradition 1	It is important to me that people are satisfied with what they have and that they not ask for more.
Schwartz PVQ	Tradition 2	My religious beliefs are important to me, and I try to do what my religion requires.
Schwartz PVQ	Tradition 3	It is important to me to do things in traditional ways and follow the customs I've learned.
Schwartz PVQ	Tradition 4	It is important to me to be humble and modest, and not to draw attention to myself.
MFQ Agreement	Care 1	Compassion for those who are suffering is the most crucial virtue.

MFQ Agreement	Care 2	One of the worst things a person could do is hurt a defenseless animal.
MFQ Agreement	Care 3	It can never be right to kill a human being.
MFQ Relevance	Care 4	It is important to me to never cause emotional harm.
MFQ Relevance	Care 5	It is important to me to care for the weak and vulnerable.
MFQ Relevance	Care 6	It is important to me to never be cruel.
MFQ Agreement	Fairness 1	When the government makes laws, the number one principle should be ensuring that everyone is treated fairly.
MFQ Agreement	Fairness 2	Justice is the most important requirement for a society.
MFQ Agreement	Fairness 3	I think it's morally wrong that rich children inherit a lot of money while poor children inherit nothing.
MFQ Relevance	Fairness 4	It is important to me to treat everyone equally.
MFQ Relevance	Fairness 5	It is important to me to never act unfairly.
MFQ Relevance	Fairness 6	It is important to me to respect everyone's rights.
MFQ Agreement	Loyalty 1	I am proud of my country's history.
MFQ Agreement	Loyalty 2	People should be loyal to their family members, even when they have done something wrong.
MFQ Agreement	Loyalty 3	It is more important to be a team player than to express oneself.
MFQ Relevance	Loyalty 4	It is important to me to show love for my country.
MFQ Relevance	Loyalty 5	It is important to me to never betray my group.
MFQ Relevance	Loyalty 6	It is important to me to be loyal.
MFQ Agreement	Authority 1	Respect for authority is something all children need to learn.
MFQ Agreement	Authority 2	Men and women each have different roles to play in society.
MFQ Agreement	Authority 3	If I were a soldier and disagreed with my commanding officer's orders, I would obey anyway because that is my duty.
MFQ Relevance	Authority 4	It is important to me to show respect for authority.
MFQ Relevance	Authority 5	It is important to me to conform to the traditions of society.
MFQ Relevance	Authority 6	Order and organization are important to me.

MFQ Agreement	Sanctity 1	People should not do things that are disgusting, even if no one is harmed.
MFQ Agreement	Sanctity 2	I would call some acts wrong on the grounds that they are unnatural.
MFQ Agreement	Sanctity 3	Chastity is an important and valuable virtue.
MFQ Relevance	Sanctity 4	It is important to me to be pure and decent.
MFQ Relevance	Sanctity 5	It is important to me not to do anything disgusting.
MFQ Relevance	Sanctity 6	It is important to me to always act in a way that God would approve.
Political Values	Equality 1	One of the big problems in this country is that we don't give everyone an equal chance.
Political Values	Equality 2	If wealth were more equal in this country, we would have many fewer problems.
Political Values	Equality 3	We have gone too far in pushing equality in this country.
Political Values	Equality 4	All in all, I think economic differences in this country are justified.
Political Values	Equality 5	More equality of income would allow most people to live better.
Political Values	Equality 6	Incomes should be more equal because every family's needs for food, housing, and so on, are the same.
Political Values	Equality 7	This country would be better off if we worried less about how equal people are.
Political Values	Equality 8	Incomes cannot be made more equal since people's abilities and talents are unequal.
Political Values	Humanitarianism 1	One should always find ways to help others less fortunate than oneself.
Political Values	Humanitarianism 2	It is better not to be too kind to people because kindness will only be abused.
Political Values	Humanitarianism 3	The dignity and welfare of people should be the most important concern in any society.
Political Values	Humanitarianism 4	People tend to pay more attention to the well-being of others than they should.
Political Values	Humanitarianism 5	All people who are unable to provide for their basic needs should be helped by others.
Political Values	Humanitarianism 6	One of the problems of today's society is that we are often too kind to people who don't deserve it.
Political Values	Humanitarianism 7	A person should always be concerned about the well-being of others.
Political Values	Humanitarianism 8	I believe it is best not to get involved taking care of other people's needs.
Political Values	Moral Traditionalism 1	This country would have many fewer problems if there were more emphasis on traditional family ties.


Political Values	Moral Traditionalism 2	The newer lifestyles are contributing to the breakdown of our society.
Political Values	Moral Tolerance 1	The world is always changing and we should adjust our views of moral behavior to those changes.
Political Values	Moral Tolerance 2	We should be more tolerant of people who choose to live according to their own moral standards, even if they are very different from our own.
Political Values	Individualism 1	Most people who don't get ahead should not blame the system; they only have themselves to blame.
Political Values	Individualism 2	Even if people try hard, they often cannot reach their goals.
Political Values	Individualism 3	Any person who is willing to work hard has a good chance of succeeding.
Political Values	Individualism 4	Hard work offers little guarantee of success.
Political Values	Individualism 5	Even if people are ambitious, they often cannot succeed.
Political Values	Individualism 6	If people work hard, they almost always get what they want.
Political Values	Limited Government 1	The less government the better.
Political Values	Limited Government 2	There are more things the government should be doing.
Political Values	Limited Government 3	We need a strong government to handle today's complex economic problems.
Political Values	Limited Government 4	The free market can handle today's economic problems without government being involved.
Political Values	Limited Government 5	The main reason government has become bigger over the years is because it has gotten involved in things that people should do for themselves.
Political Values	Limited Government 6	Government has become bigger because the problems we face today have become bigger.

A3. Typology- and Value-level Moralization Estimates for Those Who Reject the Value

In this section, we show moralization estimates at the typology and value levels among those who reject the value and compare them with estimates among value endorsers (latter shown in the main text). Figure A4 shows that at the typology level, moralization levels are lower among people who reject a value, especially for the Schwartz values and moral foundations. This indicates that when people reject a value, that attitude is not necessarily held with moral conviction and may stem from a wider variety of reasons. We reach similar conclusions with Figure A5 at the value level. Interestingly, the only case where average moralization is significantly higher among value rejectors than value endorsers is for moral tolerance. This reflects the possibility that those who reject moral tolerance do so because of strong adherence to


a certain moral value. In that case, it makes sense for people to be morally convicted about their rejection of moral tolerance.

Figure A4: Moralization Among Value Supporters and Opponents at Typology Level



Note: Mean moralization estimates from an OLS model that regresses moral conviction on typology dummy variables and respondent random effects. These are coefficient estimates for the three typologies calculated in the model without an intercept. Full model results are available in Table D3 of the Supplemental Materials on the Dataverse.

Figure A5: Moralization Among Value Supporters and Opponents at Value Level



Note: Mean moralization estimates from an OLS model that regresses moral conviction on value dummy variables and respondent random effects. These are coefficient estimates for the 21 fixed effects calculated in the model without an intercept. The value system of each of the values on


the vertical axis is indicated with “S” for Schwartz values, “P” for political values, and “MF” for moral foundations. Full model results are available in Table D4 of the Supplemental Materials on the Dataverse.

A4. Value Moralization Between Liberals and Conservatives

We are not interested in differences in value moralization between liberals and conservatives because we see them as tangential to our main argument that cooperative values are more moralized. However, it is worth examining empirically whether moralization levels are similar or different across ideological groups. Figure A6 shows moralization estimates at the value level for liberal and conservative respondents separately. All respondents in the analysis endorse the value in question. We classify strong, not so strong, and leaning Democrats as liberal and strong, not so strong, and leaning Republicans as conservative.


As seen in Figure A6, results are not that different. As noted in the main text, the correlation between moralization estimates between liberals and conservatives is quite high, 0.77. But there are some differences when it comes to political values. Conservatives moralize equality less, and moral traditionalism, individualism, and limited government more. This makes sense if we think of equality as a value associated with liberal political views, while moral traditionalism, individualism, and limited government are associated with conservative political views. That is indeed the case when we analyze value support among liberals and conservatives in our data (see Figure A7). In short, Figures A6 and A7 jointly show that for values on which there is divergence in support between liberals and conservatives, moralization estimates tend to be different as well. There is a correspondence between strength of support for a value and moralization of that value. Specifically, we find a statistically significant correlation of 0.39 between moral conviction and strength of support for the value, among value supporters.

Figure A6: Moralization Among Liberals and Conservatives



Note: Mean moralization estimates from an OLS model that regresses moral conviction on value dummy variables and respondent random effects. These are coefficient estimates for the 21 fixed effects calculated in the model without an intercept. The value system of each of the values on the vertical axis is indicated with “S” for Schwartz values, “P” for political values, and “MF” for moral foundations. Full model results are available in Table D5 of the Supplemental Materials on the Dataverse.

Figure A7: Value Support Among Liberals and Conservatives




Note: Mean moralization estimates from an OLS model that regresses moral conviction on value dummy variables and respondent random effects. These are coefficient estimates for the 21 fixed effects calculated in the model without an intercept. The value system of each of the values on the vertical axis is indicated with “S” for Schwartz values, “P” for political values, and “MF” for moral foundations. Full model results are available in Table D6 of the Supplemental Materials on the Dataverse.

A5. Robustness Tests of Main Effect of Value Disagreement

Figure 3 in the main text presents the direct effect of value disagreement on an averaged index of social polarization. Figures A8 and A9 below show that the results are similar with alternative models. Figure A8 presents results for liberals and conservatives separately. Figure A9 presents the main result when we include a variable for the hypothetical profile’s partisanship, instead of having separate variables for copartisanship and out-partisanship.


Figure A10 shows the results of separate models for the three outcomes, *Favorability*, *Neighbor* (social distance) and *House* (trust). Again, value disagreement, relative to value agreement, has the largest effect of any of the variables. The effect of value disagreement is largest for favorability and smallest for trust. Value disagreement reduces favorable attitudes by 0.14, social distance by 0.11, and trust by 0.09. This is an interesting result suggesting that, when we do not take into account moralization of the value, value disagreement matters somewhat more for an outcome that does not involve social interaction but is an expression of simple affect.

Figure A8: Main Effect of Value Disagreement (Liberals and Conservatives Separately)




Note: Full model results are available in Table D8 of the Supplemental Materials on the Dataverse.

Figure A9: Main Effect of Value Disagreement (Using Partisanship Control)



Note: Full model results are available in Table D9 of the Supplemental Materials on the Dataverse.

Figure A10: Main Effect of Value Disagreement, Separate Outcomes



Note: Full model results are available in Table D10 of the Supplemental Materials on the Dataverse.

A6. Full Model Results and Robustness Tests of the Interaction between Value Disagreement and Moralization

Table A3 shows the full model outputs of the results presented in Figure 4 of the main text. And following our pre-registration document, we also ran models that include respondents who do not have a position about the focal value, i.e., those who chose “Neither agree nor disagree.” These models have an additional interaction between an indicator for those who chose the middle category and stated level of moral conviction. Figure A11 shows the effects of value disagreement along the range of moral conviction for our three outcome variables separately. Figure A12, on the other hand, shows the results when the main interaction models include respondent fixed effects. See Table A4 for full model results of Figures A11 and A12.

Figure A13 presents the results of the main interaction models when we only analyze respondents who endorse a value. Additionally, we ran the main interaction models with a control for strength of attitude toward the value. The attitude strength variable takes the value of ‘1’ if the respondent strongly endorses or rejects the value and ‘0’ if they somewhat endorse or reject the value. Results are presented in Figure A14. Table A5 below presents the full model results of Figures A13 and A14.

All these results point to the same conclusion. Not only does higher moralization exacerbate the effect of value disagreement on attitudes, but also the moderating effect is starker for more socially interactive outcomes, i.e., social distance and trust.

Table A3: Full Model Results of Figure 4 in the Main Text

VARIABLES	(1) Favorability	(2) Neighbor	(3) House
Value disagreement	-0.066* (0.020)	-0.021 (0.021)	-0.003 (0.021)
Moral conviction	0.022* (0.004)	0.020* (0.005)	0.031* (0.005)
Value disagreement x Moral conviction	-0.019* (0.006)	-0.026* (0.006)	-0.025* (0.006)
Gender: Woman	0.010 (0.007)	0.007 (0.007)	0.013 (0.007)
Age: 37	-0.014 (0.011)	-0.013 (0.011)	-0.018 (0.012)
Age: 46	0.000 (0.010)	0.005 (0.010)	0.005 (0.012)
Age: 55	-0.013 (0.010)	-0.008 (0.010)	-0.004 (0.012)
Age: 63	0.006 (0.011)	0.002 (0.011)	0.006 (0.012)
Ethnicity: Hispanic	0.023* (0.009)	0.008 (0.010)	0.011 (0.011)
Ethnicity: African-American	0.042* (0.010)	0.048* (0.010)	0.030* (0.011)
Ethnicity: Asian	0.038* (0.011)	0.036* (0.011)	0.033* (0.012)
Partisanship: Republican	-0.013 (0.010)	-0.016 (0.010)	-0.011 (0.011)
Partisanship: Independent	0.012 (0.008)	0.011 (0.008)	0.005 (0.008)
Career: Technology	-0.011 (0.013)	-0.003 (0.013)	-0.015 (0.014)
Career: Small business owner	-0.003 (0.013)	-0.006 (0.013)	-0.010 (0.015)
Career: Law	-0.011 (0.014)	0.003 (0.014)	0.005 (0.015)

Career: Health care	-0.020 (0.013)	-0.003 (0.013)	-0.005 (0.014)
Career: Education	-0.013 (0.013)	-0.006 (0.013)	-0.012 (0.014)
Career: Agriculture	-0.013 (0.013)	-0.008 (0.013)	-0.010 (0.014)
Career: Retail	-0.009 (0.014)	0.000 (0.014)	-0.019 (0.016)
Religion: Jewish	0.050* (0.018)	0.059* (0.020)	0.045* (0.021)
Religion: Catholic	0.010 (0.010)	0.015 (0.010)	0.010 (0.011)
Religion: Mainline protestant	-0.002 (0.010)	0.017 (0.011)	0.010 (0.012)
Religion: Evangelical protestant	0.009 (0.010)	0.013 (0.010)	0.013 (0.011)
Religion: Mormon	-0.042* (0.021)	-0.022 (0.021)	0.001 (0.022)
Religion: Muslim	0.030 (0.023)	0.064* (0.025)	0.019 (0.026)
Education: Associate degree	0.014 (0.010)	0.019 (0.010)	0.014 (0.010)
Education: Bachelor degree	0.008 (0.009)	0.012 (0.010)	0.004 (0.010)
Education: Graduate degree	0.024* (0.009)	0.027* (0.010)	0.033* (0.011)
Hobby: Food	-0.023 (0.015)	-0.032* (0.014)	-0.022 (0.016)
Hobby: Reading	-0.005 (0.014)	-0.006 (0.014)	0.003 (0.015)
Hobby: Video games	-0.019 (0.014)	-0.019 (0.014)	-0.010 (0.015)
Hobby: Travel	-0.016 (0.014)	-0.025 (0.015)	-0.014 (0.016)
Hobby: Exercise	-0.026 (0.015)	-0.028 (0.014)	-0.016 (0.016)
Hobby: Arts and crafts	-0.004 (0.015)	-0.010 (0.015)	-0.018 (0.016)
Hobby: Watching sports	-0.010 (0.014)	-0.024 (0.014)	0.001 (0.015)
Hobby: Watching TV	-0.013 (0.014)	-0.018 (0.014)	-0.042* (0.016)
Intercept	0.627* (0.025)	0.614* (0.026)	0.431* (0.027)
Observations	4,226	4,222	4,209

R-squared


0.111

0.082

0.061


Note: * $p < 0.05$

Figure A11: Interaction Effects Including Respondents Without Value Position




Note: Full model results are available in models 1-3 of Table D11 of the Supplemental Materials on the Dataverse.

Figure A12: Interaction Effects Including Respondents Fixed Effects




Note: Full model results are available in models 4-6 of Table D11 of the Supplemental Materials on the Dataverse.

Figure A13: Interaction Effects Among Value-Endorsing Respondents



Note: Full model results are available in models 1-3 of Table D12 of the Supplemental Materials on the Dataverse.

Figure A14: Interaction Effects (Including Control for Value Attitude Strength)



Note: Full model results are available in models 4-6 of Table D12 of the Supplemental Materials on the Dataverse.

A7. Full Model Results of Regressions that Interact Value Disagreement and Value

Figures 5 and 6 in the main text presented the estimated effects of value disagreement at the value level. These are from models that extend the main effects model presented in Figure 3 of the main text by interacting value disagreement with each of the 21 values. Table A6 below shows the full regression outputs. Model 1 uses the averaged index as the outcome. Models 2, 3 and 4 use favorability, social distance, and trust, respectively.

Table A6: Full Model Results of Figures 5 and 6 in Main Text

VARIABLES	(1) Index	(2) Favorability	(3) Neighbor	(4) House
Value disagreement	-0.092* (0.027)	-0.127* (0.031)	-0.088* (0.031)	-0.063 (0.032)
S: Self-Direction	-0.023 (0.026)	-0.004 (0.028)	-0.040 (0.030)	-0.029 (0.032)
S: Hedonism	-0.019	-0.006	-0.013	-0.037

	(0.027)	(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.033)
S: Benevolence	0.038	0.048	0.028	0.037
	(0.026)	(0.028)	(0.031)	(0.032)
S: Power	-0.038	-0.033	-0.025	-0.057
	(0.028)	(0.031)	(0.033)	(0.034)
S: Universalism	0.031	0.039	0.018	0.031
	(0.024)	(0.027)	(0.030)	(0.031)
S: Achievement	-0.065*	-0.058*	-0.069*	-0.071*
	(0.024)	(0.028)	(0.029)	(0.030)
S: Security	-0.014	-0.008	-0.001	-0.039
	(0.028)	(0.031)	(0.032)	(0.034)
S: Stimulation	-0.016	0.004	0.004	-0.064*
	(0.026)	(0.029)	(0.030)	(0.032)
S: Conformity	-0.014	-0.020	-0.014	-0.014
	(0.028)	(0.030)	(0.032)	(0.034)
S: Tradition	-0.019	-0.015	-0.032	-0.011
	(0.027)	(0.029)	(0.032)	(0.035)
MF: Care	0.015	0.042	-0.014	0.023
	(0.025)	(0.028)	(0.032)	(0.031)
MF: Fairness	0.019	0.029	0.019	0.005
	(0.027)	(0.029)	(0.032)	(0.033)
MF: Loyalty	0.006	0.012	0.011	-0.005
	(0.027)	(0.029)	(0.032)	(0.031)
MF: Authority	-0.004	0.002	-0.002	-0.012
	(0.027)	(0.029)	(0.030)	(0.033)
MF: Sanctity	-0.011	-0.015	-0.021	0.001
	(0.027)	(0.031)	(0.032)	(0.033)
P: Equality	0.008	0.007	0.022	-0.006
	(0.027)	(0.029)	(0.032)	(0.032)
P: Humanitarianism	-0.011	-0.019	-0.001	-0.014
	(0.030)	(0.033)	(0.034)	(0.037)
P: Moral Traditionalism	0.001	-0.008	0.007	0.002
	(0.026)	(0.029)	(0.030)	(0.030)
P: Moral Tolerance	-0.009	-0.009	-0.007	-0.018
	(0.025)	(0.027)	(0.029)	(0.032)
P: Individualism	-0.035	-0.026	-0.041	-0.040
	(0.027)	(0.029)	(0.031)	(0.034)
Disagree x S: Self-Direction	0.015	0.012	0.029	0.009
	(0.037)	(0.040)	(0.042)	(0.046)
Disagree x S: Hedonism	0.023	0.041	0.022	0.007
	(0.038)	(0.042)	(0.043)	(0.046)
Disagree x S: Benevolence	-0.117*	-0.103*	-0.106*	-0.138*
	(0.038)	(0.042)	(0.044)	(0.046)
Disagree x S: Power	0.002	0.038	-0.006	-0.027
	(0.039)	(0.046)	(0.044)	(0.048)
Disagree x S: Universalism	-0.095*	-0.093*	-0.097*	-0.090*

	(0.036)	(0.040)	(0.042)	(0.044)
Disagree x S: Achievement	0.051	0.063	0.057	0.037
	(0.036)	(0.042)	(0.041)	(0.045)
Disagree x S: Security	-0.023	-0.008	-0.044	-0.007
	(0.039)	(0.044)	(0.044)	(0.047)
Disagree x S: Stimulation	0.049	0.061	0.015	0.082
	(0.037)	(0.043)	(0.042)	(0.045)
Disagree x S: Conformity	-0.053	-0.024	-0.049	-0.079
	(0.038)	(0.043)	(0.043)	(0.046)
Disagree x S: Tradition	0.029	0.062	0.028	-0.003
	(0.037)	(0.042)	(0.043)	(0.049)
Disagree x MF: Care	-0.079*	-0.074	-0.057	-0.115*
	(0.039)	(0.044)	(0.046)	(0.045)
Disagree x MF: Fairness	-0.072	-0.096*	-0.075	-0.041
	(0.039)	(0.044)	(0.046)	(0.046)
Disagree x MF: Loyalty	-0.041	-0.011	-0.045	-0.068
	(0.038)	(0.043)	(0.044)	(0.045)
Disagree x MF: Authority	0.008	0.016	-0.010	0.017
	(0.037)	(0.042)	(0.042)	(0.046)
Disagree x MF: Sanctity	-0.017	0.022	-0.007	-0.066
	(0.038)	(0.045)	(0.045)	(0.048)
Disagree x P: Equality	-0.046	-0.032	-0.064	-0.040
	(0.038)	(0.043)	(0.044)	(0.046)
Disagree x P: Humanitarianism	-0.040	-0.013	-0.059	-0.046
	(0.040)	(0.044)	(0.046)	(0.050)
Disagree x P: Moral Traditionalism	0.003	0.014	-0.003	-0.002
	(0.038)	(0.045)	(0.042)	(0.046)
Disagree x P: Moral Tolerance	-0.032	-0.021	-0.032	-0.033
	(0.037)	(0.041)	(0.042)	(0.045)
Disagree x P: Individualism	0.013	0.016	0.003	0.022
	(0.038)	(0.041)	(0.044)	(0.047)
Copartisan	0.039*	0.042*	0.041*	0.034*
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.010)
Outpartisan	-0.051*	-0.055*	-0.055*	-0.041*
	(0.009)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)
Gender: Woman	0.011	0.011	0.008	0.013
	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.008)
Age: 37	-0.016	-0.016	-0.013	-0.020
	(0.009)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.012)
Age: 46	0.003	0.000	0.004	0.005
	(0.009)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.012)
Age: 55	-0.007	-0.012	-0.007	-0.003
	(0.009)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.012)
Age: 63	0.005	0.007	0.001	0.007
	(0.009)	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.012)
Ethnicity: Hispanic	0.014	0.023*	0.008	0.010

	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.010)	(0.011)
Ethnicity: African-American	0.039*	0.040*	0.046*	0.030*
	(0.009)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.011)
Ethnicity: Asian	0.033*	0.035*	0.032*	0.032*
	(0.009)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.012)
Career: Technology	-0.004	-0.006	0.001	-0.010
	(0.012)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.014)
Career: Small business owner	-0.005	-0.002	-0.006	-0.009
	(0.012)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.015)
Career: Law	0.001	-0.009	0.003	0.008
	(0.012)	(0.013)	(0.014)	(0.015)
Career: Health care	-0.005	-0.016	-0.000	-0.001
	(0.012)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.014)
Career: Education	-0.009	-0.013	-0.005	-0.011
	(0.011)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.014)
Career: Agriculture	-0.003	-0.007	-0.003	-0.003
	(0.012)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.014)
Career: Retail	-0.001	-0.002	0.006	-0.011
	(0.012)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.015)
Religion: Jewish	0.051*	0.052*	0.060*	0.044*
	(0.017)	(0.018)	(0.020)	(0.022)
Religion: Catholic	0.012	0.013	0.017	0.011
	(0.009)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.011)
Religion: Mainline protestant	0.009	-0.002	0.017	0.012
	(0.009)	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.012)
Religion: Evangelical protestant	0.015	0.012	0.017	0.016
	(0.009)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.011)
Religion: Mormon	-0.024	-0.047*	-0.019	-0.005
	(0.019)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.023)
Religion: Muslim	0.043*	0.037	0.069*	0.026
	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.025)	(0.027)
Education: Associate degree	0.018*	0.017	0.023*	0.014
	(0.009)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)
Education: Bachelor degree	0.009	0.009	0.014	0.004
	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.010)	(0.010)
Education: Graduate degree	0.027*	0.023*	0.026*	0.033*
	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.010)	(0.011)
Hobby: Food	-0.028*	-0.029	-0.037*	-0.021
	(0.013)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.016)
Hobby: Reading	-0.001	-0.005	-0.007	0.007
	(0.013)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.016)
Hobby: Video games	-0.020	-0.024	-0.021	-0.013
	(0.012)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.015)
Hobby: Travel	-0.021	-0.019	-0.028	-0.015
	(0.013)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.016)
Hobby: Exercise	-0.023	-0.027	-0.029*	-0.012

	(0.013)	(0.015)	(0.014)	(0.016)
Hobby: Arts and crafts	-0.008	-0.004	-0.009	-0.012
	(0.013)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.016)
Hobby: Watching sports	-0.011	-0.012	-0.026	0.004
	(0.012)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.015)
Hobby: Watching TV	-0.027*	-0.018	-0.022	-0.043*
	(0.013)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.016)
Intercept	0.652*	0.710*	0.695*	0.550*
	(0.027)	(0.030)	(0.031)	(0.033)
Observations	4,209	4,233	4,229	4,216
R-squared	0.129	0.138	0.106	0.073

Note: Model presents the results of Figure 5 in the main text. Models 2 to 4 are for Figure 6 in the main text. * $p < 0.05$

A8. Data Collection Ethics

Our data collection procedures adhere to the American Political Science Association’s *Principles and Guidance for Human Subjects Research*. The two pilot studies using samples from MTurk and Lucid as well the main study using NORC’s probability-based AmeriSpeak Panel received Institutional Review Board approval at the authors’ institution prior to data collection (STUDY ID’s: 00003370, 00003480, 00003815). The surveys and embedded experiments did not involve any deception. There were not any sensitive questions, and the data are anonymous. Respondents read an informed consent page and voluntarily participated in the surveys. Respondents from the AmeriSpeak Panel received “AmeriPoints” from NORC for participating in our study. For the Lucid pilot study, we paid each respondent \$1.00, which is the predetermined rate for academic surveys shorter than 15 minutes. MTurk participants received \$1.00 for completing the survey. We estimated the survey would take approximately eight minutes, placing the pay rate slightly above federal minimum wage at the time it was fielded.

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